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Povzetek
Izraz “racˇunalniˇstvo v oblaku” je zaradi potenciala spremembe trenutne
racˇunalniˇske industrije v srediˇscˇu pozornosti racˇunalnicˇarjev. Zˇal pa sˇe vedno
obstajajo ovire, ki jih je treba razresˇiti, saj so v racˇunalniˇstvu, osnovanem v
oblakih, varnostni aspekti sˇe vedno osrednji problem.
Cilj nasˇega dela je identificirati glavne probleme varnosti v zvezi z racˇunal-
niˇstvom v oblaku in predstaviti plasti za varne oblake. Nasˇe raziskave se osre-
dotocˇajo tudi na podatkovne in shrambene varnostne plasti. Ugotovili smo,
da zasˇcˇita podatkov v oblaku lezˇi v kriptografiji oblaka. Ta magistrska na-
loga prikazˇe nove kriptografske tehnike, uporabljene za zasˇcˇito in procesiranje
zakodiranih podatkov v oddaljeni oblacˇni shrambi.
V nalogi predlagamo kriptografsko shemo, ki uporabi skeniranje prstnega
odtisa za preverjanje verodostojnosti uporabnika in AES tehnike 128/192/256
bitnega kljucˇa za sˇifriranje in desˇifriranje uporabnikovih podatkov. AES
omogocˇa vecˇjo podatkovno varnost v primerjavi z drugimi tehnikami sˇifriranja,
kot na primer DES in Blowfish. Nasˇo shemo smo uporabili v aplikaciji Dro-
pboxCrypt. DropBoxCrypt je aplikacija za sˇifriranje in desˇifriranje podatkov,
razvita za mobilne naprave Android, ki jo lahko uporabljamo za brskanje, pri-
dobivanje in odpiranje sˇifriranih podatkov, shranjenih v oblacˇnih shrambah.
Kljucˇne besede
racˇunalniˇstvo v oblaku, varnost v oblaku, kriptografija
i

Abstract
The term “cloud computing” has been in the spotlights of IT specialists due
to its potential of transforming computer industry. Unfortunately, there are
still some challenges to be resolved and the security aspects in the cloud
based computing environment remain at the core of interest.
The goal of our work is to identify the main security issues of cloud
computing and to present approaches to secure clouds. Our research also
focuses on data and storage security layers. As a result, we found out that the
protection of cloud data lies in cloud cryptography. Thus, this thesis reviews
the new cryptographic techniques used to protect and process encrypted data
in a remote cloud storage.
In this thesis we are proposing a cryptographic scheme which uses fin-
gerprint scanning for user authentication and AES technique of 128/192/256
bit cipher key for encryption and decryption of user’s data. AES provides
higher data security compared to other encryption techniques like DES and
Blowfish. Our scheme is used in DropBoxCrypt application. DropBoxCrypt
is a data encryption-decryption application developed for Android mobile
devices which can be used for browsing, exporting and opening encrypted
data stored in cloud storage.
Keywords
cloud computing, cloud security, cloud cryptography
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Chapter 1
Cloud computing concepts
1.1 Introduction
Cloud computing is in the spotlight of computer industry today. With its
new aspects and capabilities that have been proclaimed, cloud computing is
a rapidly evolving model. Cloud may be the next evolution in IT history and
is radically changing the way an enterprise manages its informatics systems.
There are plenty of definitions what “cloud computing” is. According
to NIST [1], cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, conve-
nient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction.
IBM says that cloud computing, often referred to as simply ”the cloud” is
a delivery of on-demand computing resources — everything from applications
to data centres — over the Internet on a pay-for-use basis [2].
Gartner defines cloud computing as a style of computing in which scalable
and elastic IT-enabled capabilities are delivered as a service using Internet
technologies [3].
Cloud computing is based on five attributes: multitenancy (shared re-
sources), massive scalability, elasticity, pay as you go, and self-provisioning
1
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of resources [4].
In simple words, it is the practice of using a network of remote servers
hosted on the Internet to store, manage, and process data, rather than a local
server or a personal computer - it allows application software to be operated
using internet-enabled devices [5].
1.2 Main features
Although there are plenty of definitions about cloud computing, we can sep-
arate a few main features. NIST [1] gave a definition of cloud computing,
which stated that the latter includes five essential characteristics:
Figure 1.1: Five essential characteristics of cloud computing [6]
On-demand self-service: Users are able to manage cloud services, such as
provision of computing power, storage, networks and software, using
only a simple online control panel. Those utilities are available when-
ever they are required, without human interaction with each service
provider.
Broad network access: Cloud services are available from every part of
the world using standard network protocols and are accessible from
every device with internet connection (workstations, laptops, tablets
and smart phones).
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Resource pooling: It allows cloud providers to pool large-scale IT resources
to serve multiple consumers with services at the same time. Providers
create a sense of immediately available resources and location inde-
pendence. On other hand, consumers have no control over the exact
location of resources, unless they specify the location on a higher level
of abstraction such as country or datacenter. The ability of serving one
instance of a program to different consumers is referred to as multite-
nancy. Multitenancy model relies on the use of virtualisation and that
way, according to demands, IT resources can be dynamically assigned
and reassigned [7].
Rapid elasticity: Ability to provide scalable services. Rapid elasticity al-
lows consumers to automatically request different types of services or
additional space, which means that resources are scaled up and down
rapidly as needed.
Measured service: Or pay as you go principle, is a way in which a provider
measures the effective use of services and resources of a consumer.
1.3 The cloud delivery model
Service oriented architecture (SOA) is a modern model, which is a base for
cloud computing. It focuses on delivering integrated services to consumer,
using different functions and approaches. With different combinations of
these functionalities, providers can offer a few ways of using the benefits of
the cloud. According to that, there are three fundamental models: software
as a service (SaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and infrastructure as a ser-
vice (IaaS). This concept is known as SPI (Software-Platform-Infrastructure)
service delivery model [8] [9] [1] [4] [10].
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Figure 1.2: Cloud service delivery methods [6]
1.3.1 Software as a Service (SaaS)
SaaS offers complete and finished application on demand and represents the
ability provided to the consumer to use one or more computer resources
running on a cloud infrastructure. SaaS operates in the following manner: a
single software instance runs in a cloud and supports multiple end consumers
at the same time. The consumer has access to the service through any
authorized device across the Internet, with no need of installing and running
the application on that device. The consumer rents the software on a pay-
per-use model or has free limited use for some services.
The number of tenants supported by the application is the main difference
between traditional software model and SaaS model. Traditional software
represents a single-tenant model, it is installed on a server and runs only for
a single consumer. On the other hand, the multi-tenant architecture model
used by SaaS allows one physical hardware infrastructure to be shared among
many different consumers, and it will be unique for each of them [4].
Key benefits of using the SaaS model are [4]:
• The cost of software license, hardware, operations and maintenance is
reduced by hosting to a third party.
• SaaS centralized control allows vendors to control and limit the use.
• The majority of SaaS applications are delivered with the Web as infras-
tructure. Some SaaS vendors provide their own application interface,
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whereas other SaaS apps can be accessed via web browser.
• SaaS deployment does not require any specific hardware or software.
• Vendors are responsible for the management of SaaS applications.
In this model, consumer cannot manage cloud infrastructure including
network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application
capabilities, except some limited user configuration settings.
Most widely used examples of SaaS include Salesforce CRM, Google Docs,
Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo Email, Gmail, MobileMe, Zoho, etc.
1.3.2 Platform as a Service (PaaS)
PaaS gives a consumer an operating system and programming environment
and offers its usage for every phase of software development and testing.
PaaS enables a software deployment model in which consumers are able to
develop and deploy their own application to the cloud infrastructure, using
programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by provider.
Provider is paid for providing these platforms and distribution services.
PaaS services represent a development platform composed of predefined
building blocks, used by consumers to create their own applications. Devel-
opment tools are hosted in the cloud and there is no need for additional tools
on developer’s computer or any system administration skills for deployment.
Due to low cost and complexity of buying and setting servers up, PaaS sys-
tems are widely used by start-up companies and self-employed developers [4].
There are a few differences when compared to traditional development
environments. Multi-tenant development tools in clouds support multiple
users with multiple active projects, while traditional tools are designed for
only one user. Multi-tenant deployment architecture offers application and
data scalability and supports runtime monitoring [4].
In this model, consumer cannot manage cloud infrastructure including
network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over deployed
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applications. PaaS can reduce the cost of buying, housing and managing
software platforms.
Examples of such platforms are Google App Engine, Microsoft Azure,
IBM SmartCloud Application Services, Amazon Web Services, etc.
1.3.3 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
IaaS provides use of basic computing infrastructure of servers, software and
network equipment and other fundamental computing resources, which are
presented in an on-demand service form. Consumers have direct access to
storage, processing and other computing resources throughout the network,
where they are able to deploy and run appropriate software [10]. On the
other hand, they do not have insight into infrastructure details, including
location, data partitioning, security, backup and scaling.
The novelties brought by cloud hosting have enabled that pay-per-use
model is offered and that services are scaled. On provider’s side, the offered
infrastructure can increase or decrease its capacity, depending on consumer’s
demands. Except for providing application hosting, some IaaS providers can
support a wide range of additional services, such as application development,
support and enhancements [4].
The IaaS model is similar to utility computing [4], where computing ser-
vices are provided on-demand, just like utilities [11]. Consumer cannot man-
age cloud infrastructure but has control over storage, operating systems and
deployed applications. With IaaS we can avoid buying, housing and manag-
ing the basic hardware and software infrastructure [1].
Commercial examples include Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2),
Terremark Enterprise Cloud, Rackspace, Joyent, IBM Computing on De-
mand, etc.
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1.4 Cloud deployment models
Depending on requirements, there are a few ways of deploying cloud ser-
vices [1]: private cloud, community cloud, public cloud, and hybrid cloud.
Each of them offers some additional benefits.
1.4.1 Private cloud
Private cloud infrastructure is built for exclusive use of consumers of a specific
organization, where the enterprise computing architecture is protected by
a firewall. An organization has control over security, data and quality of
service. The cloud may be owned, managed, and operated by an organization
or by a third party and may be deployed in its own datacenter [10].
Figure 1.3: Cloud deployment models
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Private cloud is dedicated to a single organizational tenant. An organi-
zation must buy, build and manage the cloud with its pitfalls, governance
and reliability concerns. The customer is responsible for cloud operation and
should have a high degree of control of physical and logical security aspects
of cloud infrastructure [4].
1.4.2 Community cloud
In community cloud, the infrastructure is used by a specific community of
consumers from organizations that have similar requirements (compliance,
security, policy) or share the same infrastructure (government, healthcare,
finance). The cloud may be owned, managed, and operated by one or more
of the organizations in the community, a combination of them or by a third
party. The costs are spread over fewer consumers [1].
1.4.3 Public cloud
Infrastructure in public clouds is open for general public on the Internet,
where everyone has free access to use applications and storage of service
provider. Resources and services are available over the Internet as web ap-
plications or web services [4]. Public clouds reduce consumer risk and cost
by providing a flexible entry in cloud infrastructure. They may be owned,
managed, and operated by a business or government organization, or a com-
bination of them, from one or more data centres. Public cloud services may
be free or offered through a pay-per-usage model [1]. Security management
and cloud service operations have obligations towards vendors, because a
consumer does not have any control and oversight over physical and logical
security aspects [4].
1.4.4 Hybrid cloud
Hybrid cloud is a composition of two or more clouds (private, community or
public) that remain unique entities, but are bound together by standardized
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or proprietary technology. It offers the benefits of multiple deployment mod-
els [1]. With the help of this cloud, organizations can use public cloud for
less sensitive applications, and a private cloud for maintenance of core and
sensitive applications and data [4].
1.5 Moving to the cloud
Although cloud computing adoption brings many benefits, there are security
issues that may present possible risk. If it’s important to move some criti-
cal applications to the cloud, it’s recommended to apply additional security
controls. When adopting the cloud, it is crucial to have a thorough under-
standing of how to integrate cloud solutions into existing architecture. Hav-
ing in mind that there is such variety of cloud deployment options and cloud
delivery models, it’s impossible to cover all circumstances with a single list
of security controls. However, a risk-based approach to moving to the cloud
may help with initial cloud risks and security decisions. For that purpose,
CSA [12] recommends following a quick simple framework for evaluating the
tolerance for moving an asset to various cloud computing models [13]:
Identifying the asset for cloud deployment
Assets that can be supported may be data or applications, functions
and processes. They don’t have to be located on the same location or
present all parts of the function; some parts can be hosted in their own
datacentres and some parts in the cloud. In this step, it is important
to determine exactly which data or function is being considered for the
cloud.
Evaluating the asset
After identifying the asset, we need to determine how important the
data or function are for a consumer. It is sufficient to answer a few
simple questions, for example, how would one be harmed if the asset
became widely public and distributed, if the process was manipulated
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Figure 1.4: 5-3-2 principle of cloud computing
by an outsider or if the asset was unavailable for a period of time. There
is no need for detailed valuation, we only need the essential assessment
of confidentiality, integrity and availability of the asset.
Mapping the asset to potential cloud deployment models
It is of great importance to determine which deployment and hosting
model fits security and risk requirements for the given asset. We should
know the strength of security that is required and our comfort levels
for transitioning.
Evaluating the potential cloud service models and providers
This step is focused on the degree of control needed at each SPI tier to
implement any required risk management.
Sketching the potential data flow
If a specific deployment option is being evaluated, data flow between
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an organization, a cloud service and users needs to be mapped out.
Before making a final decision, it’s essential to understand whether
and in what manner data can move in and out of the cloud.
1.5.1 Summary
Before they move to the cloud, customers should understand the sensibility
of the information they want to store, the risks and which combinations of
deployment and service models are acceptable for them. Needed security
levels are different for various types of data. Low-value data do not require
high level of security controls and many of the recommendations can be
skipped, such as complex encryption schemes. Not all cloud deployments
need every possible security and risk control. It is left for customers to
decide which level of security they will apply [13].
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Chapter 2
Cloud security
Cloud computing is at an advantage compared to the traditional IT models.
However, security concerns remain a major barrier for its adoption. A sur-
vey from IDCI in 2009 shows that 74% of IT managers and CIOs believed
that cloud computing security issues are the primary challenge that hinders
them from using cloud computing services [14]. Surveys show that the top
issue organizations have when considering the adoption of public cloud-based
computing services is “security and privacy” [15]. Additionally, more than
70% of CTOs believed that the primary reason not to use cloud computing
services is that there are data security and privacy concerns [15].
Major cloud computing vendors had successively reported several acci-
dents in 2008 and 2009. Amazon’s Simple Storage Service was interrupted
twice in February [16] and July 2008 [17]. In March 2009 [18], security
vulnerabilities in Google Docs even led to serious leakage of private user in-
formation. Google Gmail was experiencing a global failure for more than
two hours in February 2009 [19]. There was serious security vulnerability
in VMware virtualization software for Mac version in May 2009 [20]. Mi-
crosoft’s Azure cloud computing platform also experienced a serious outage
accident for about 22 hours in March 2009 [21]. Serious security incidents
even lead to the collapse of cloud computing vendors. As administrators’
misuse had led to the loss of 45% of user data, cloud storage vendor LinkUp
13
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was forced to close in August 2008 [22].
Security control measures in cloud are similar to those in traditional IT
environment. However, cloud computing may face different risks and chal-
lenges, because of multi-tenant characteristics, service delivery models and
deployment models.
2.1 Cloud computing security issues
2.1.1 Cloud computing security
Cloud computing security is an evolving sub-domain of computer security,
network security, and, more broadly, information security. It refers to a broad
set of policies, technologies, and controls deployed to protect data, applica-
tions, and the associated infrastructure of cloud computing [23]. It represents
a response to a familiar set of security challenges that manifest differently in
the cloud. It contains a set of policies, technologies, and controls designed
to protect data, infrastructure, and clients from an attack and enable regu-
latory compliance. Security is higher when layered at each level of the stack
and integrated into a common management framework and thus providing
protection whatever delivery model is used [24].
2.1.2 Security issues associated with the cloud
There are many security issues associated with cloud computing. Cloud Se-
curity Alliance (CSA) has identified thirteen domains of concerns over cloud
computing security in its second version of Security Guidance [13] and four-
teen domains in the third edition [25]. S. Subashini and V. Kavitha give
an overview of cloud computing security issues related to cloud computing
service delivery models (SPI model), and present a detailed analysis for each
security issue in all aspects of infrastructure, including network level, host
level and application level [26]. According to Gartner [27], users should ask
vendors for seven specific safety issues: privileged user access, regulatory
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compliance, data location, data segregation, recovery, investigative support
and long-term viability. Forrester Research Inc. [28] has evaluated security
and privacy practices of some of the major cloud providers in three major
aspects: security and privacy, compliance, and legal and contractual issues.
Mohamed Al Morsy, John Grundy and Ingo Mu¨ller explored cloud com-
puting security issues from different perspectives, including security issues
associated with cloud computing architecture, service delivery models, cloud
characteristics and cloud stakeholders [29] [20].
2.1.3 Security issues according to Cloud Security Al-
liance
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has identified fourteen domains of concerns
over cloud computing security, divided into two broad categories: governance
and operations [25].
Domain 1: Cloud computing architectural framework
This domain provides a conceptual framework for Cloud Security Alliance’s
guidance. Here are some basic issues, necessary to ensure cloud computing
security: terminology, architectural requirements and challenges for secur-
ing cloud applications and services, and a reference model that describes
taxonomy of cloud services and architectures.
CSA defined cloud computing as [13]:
Cloud computing (‘cloud’) is an evolving term that describes the
development of many existing technologies and approaches to
computing into something different. Cloud separates application
and information resources from the underlying infrastructure, and
mechanisms used to deliver them.
CSA focuses also on the architecture. From architectural perspective,
cloud is both similar to and different from existing models of computing
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and this thin line between them impacts the organizational, operational and
technological approaches to data, network and information security practices.
The main issue for understanding security risks is to understand the relation-
ship between models in the cloud reference model diagram.
Figure 2.1: Cloud Reference
Model [13]
IaaS is located at the top of the
model diagram, meaning it repre-
sents the foundation of other mod-
els. By this model, the services in-
herit not only their capabilities, but
also security issues and risks. Ac-
cording to provider/consumer secu-
rity responsibilities, there are also
differences between these levels. The
lower provider goes into the refer-
ence model stack, the more respon-
sible consumer becomes for imple-
menting and managing security.
The cloud security reference
model concentrates on relationships
between all cloud services and their
security controls. It is of great im-
portance to look into all possible
cloud scenarios. Important is also
whether the cloud is private or pub-
lic, and to correlate that with physi-
cal location of the data, information
on who used the cloud and who managed it and how. Examples of visu-
alizing those relationships are shown in the next table of cloud computing
deployment models and in the Jericho Cloud Cube Model [30].
The Cloud Cube Model illustrates the variations of cloud offerings, using
four different dimensions [30]:
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Figure 2.2: Cloud Cube Model [30]
Internal (I) / External (E) – dimension that defines physical location of
the data – organization boundaries
Proprietary (P) / Open (O) – dimension that defines the state of own-
ership of the cloud technology, interfaces and services
Perimeterised (Per) / De-perimeterised (D-p) Architectures – dimen-
sion that describes if we operate inside our traditional IT perimeter or
outside it
Insourced / Outsourced – dimension that explains who is running the
cloud. Insourced means that the service is provided by our own staff,
and outsourced means that the service is provided by a 3rd party
Domain 2: Governance and enterprise risk management
This domain shows an organization’s ability to govern and measure enter-
prise risk introduced by cloud computing. In order to support effective se-
curity governance and compliance, the main issues of the governance and
enterprise risk management are the identification and implementation of the
suitable organizational structures, processes and controls [13]. An effective
governance plan must be formed from well-developed information security
governance processes, as a part of organization’s obligations. The enterprise
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risk management is obliged to provide value for its partners, in a way that
can measure, manage and mitigate uncertainty. It uses methods and pro-
cesses to identify and analyse risk, and pick the appropriate risk response
strategy, which may include: avoidance, reduction, sharing or insuring and
accepting. The risk response strategy is also affected by the decision of infor-
mation risk management, which aligned the answer with the risk tolerance
of data owner [25].
There are some recommendations from CSA [12] about this domain. Main
suggestions are for investing into increased scrutiny of security capabilities
of the provider, including review of specific information security governance
structures and processes by user organization and to be mandatory to es-
tablish collaborative governance structures and processes between customers
and providers. Also, the issue of not having physical control over the infras-
tructure, makes risk management for cloud computing development more
sensitive compared to the traditional model. For this reason, it is neces-
sary to have Service Level Agreements provider documentation and contract
requirements [13] [25].
Domain 3: Legal issues: contracts and electronic discovery
This domain provides general background on potential legal issues for using
cloud computing services, such as protection requirements for information,
regulatory requirements, privacy requirements, international laws, etc. The
need for new legislation arises from the novelty brought by cloud comput-
ing paradigm, such as the time of service (on-demand and intermittent), the
anonymity of identity of a service provider and the anonymity of the loca-
tion of involved servers. When we talk about legal issues related to cloud
computing, we need to consider them through functional, jurisdictional and
contractual dimension. The functional dimension discovers which cloud com-
puting services and functions have legal implications for contributors, and the
jurisdictional dimension covers the way in which laws and regulations affect
services, data assets and contributors. The managing of and addressing le-
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gal issues is enabled by the contractual dimension, which includes contract
structures, enforcement mechanisms, and terms and conditions [13].
Considering different locations of data throughout the world, cloud ser-
vices may be subject to different laws according to the legislation of the
country in which cloud servers are. The countries from the Asia Pacific
region, have accepted data protection laws based on Privacy and Security
Guidelines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) [31] and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC) Privacy
Framework [32]. In Europe, the Europe Economic Area (EEA) Member
States have passed data protection laws tracked by the European Union
(EU) Data Protection Directive of 1995 [33] and the ePrivacy Directive of
2002 (amended in 2009) [34]. Similar laws have been adopted by Morocco
and Tunisia in Africa, and Israel and Dubai in the Middle East. North,
Central and South America countries adopted data protection laws inspired
mostly from the European model, except the United States of America, where
there are more data protection laws and related regulations, contained in the
US Federal Laws and US State Laws, such as GLBA1 [35], HIPAA2 [36],
COPPA3 [37], etc. [25].
The data transferred to the cloud must be protected by service provider
on the same level it was protected in the hands of the owner. Thus, it
is a legal requisite that a data owner and a cloud provider make a written
agreement (contract) which will define the roles, expectations and allocations
between the participants. These obligations must be attained due diligence
(before execution of the contract) or security audits (during performance of
the contract) [25].
1Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
2Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
3Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
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Domain 4: Compliance and audit management
Finding how to maintain compliance and dealing with evaluation of the ef-
fects of cloud computing on compliance with internal policies, are the main
goals for this domain. CSA advises the cloud customer to consider and
understand the regulatory applicability for given cloud service, compliance
responsibilities between the provider and the customer, provider ability to
express compliance and its relationship with providers and auditors [13].
Compliance is the last pillar of the GRC4 [38] model that we need to men-
tion. Figure 2.3 shows the tight connection between governance, risk man-
agement and compliance for ensuring security in the cloud system. While the
corporate governance gives balance between cloud participators and provides
guidance and controls, and the enterprise risk management gives methods
and processes to help making decisions, the compliance gives the adherence
and awareness to company obligations. Compliance activities ensure that
operations are fully aligned with governance processes and policies. On the
other hand, the audit plan should provide a thorough testing and reviewing
of risk management activities [25].
Figure 2.3: GRC model [31]
4Governance, risk management and compliance
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Domain 5: Information management and data security
This domain gives overview of the management of cloud data, the identi-
fication and control of data, and controls which can be used to deal with
the loss of physical control when moving data to the cloud. Those processes
and polices are included in the information management. For evaluating
and defining cloud data security strategy, CSA proposes using Data Security
Lifecycle [39]. According to the lifecycle, data go through six phases: create,
store, use, share, archive and destroy. But this lifecycle doesn’t include all
we need for the process of managing information. We also need to know the
logical and physical location of data, because DSL phases are running in dif-
ferent operating environments, and data are moving in, out of and between
these environments. Also, it is important to consider who and how accesses
to the data, and to identify functions and controls that can be performed [39].
Applying information governance is provided by data security with its
specific controls and technologies. Data security includes detecting and pre-
venting data migration to the cloud, protecting data moving to and within
the cloud, and protecting data in the cloud [25].
Domain 6: Portability and interoperability
This domain highlights the ability to move data and services from one provider
to another. From a security perspective, it is required to maintain security
controls consistency in the processes where the environment is changed [13].
CSA gives numerous recommendations in relation to interoperability,
portability and different cloud models. For hardware, it is recommended
to use virtualization whenever possible to remove many hardware level is-
sues, and to use open virtualization formats such as OVF. Changing cloud
provider does not always bring the same framework as previously used, so it
is crucial to investigate the new API and determine the differences. Before
using any cloud, it is a good practice that the customer chooses open and
published platforms to ensure broadest support for interoperability. From
storage viewpoint, the unstructured data need to be stored in an established
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portable format and need to be assessed for encryption. On the other hand,
portability recommendations include: service level, different architecture, se-
curity integration, authentication and identity management to operate across
all components of the cloud, encryption keys to be escrowed locally and to
ensure that the copies of the file metadata are securely removed [25].
Domain 7: Traditional security, business continuity and disaster
recovery
Moving data to the cloud affects traditional operational processes and proce-
dures used to implement security, business continuity and disaster recovery.
The focus in this topic is to discuss possible security risks and the fact that
some of them are unique for cloud computing [13].
When establishing traditional security functions in the cloud, must take
into consideration the evaluation of physical security and security infrastruc-
tures. For physical security, it is recommended to check the physical location
of the cloud service provider facility and to review the documentation that
supports recovery operations, such as risk analysis, risk assessments, vulnera-
bility assessments, business continuity plans, disaster recovery plans, physical
and environmental security policy, etc. After that, the customer must make
certain that the CSP5 complies with global security and industry standards,
such as ISO 27001 ISMS, TOGAF6, SABSA7, ITIL8, COSO9 or COBIT10.
To secure cloud data from intruders accessing to facilities, the Four D’s11 of
Perimeter Security must be applied, and roles and responsibilities as part of
cloud environment must be added. Confidentiality, integrity and availability
are the major principles of information security that must also be applied to
the cloud, when we are dealing with business continuity [25].
5Cloud service provider
6The Open Group Architecture Framework
7Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture
8Information Technology Infrastructure Library
9Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
10Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology
11Deter, Detect, Delay and Deny phases
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Cloud backup and disaster recovery are very important segments of cloud
storage security. The solutions for disaster recovery are based on three es-
sentials: a scalable file system, a fully virtualized storage infrastructure and
a compelling self-service recovery application [25].
Domain 8: Data center operations
This domain is primarily focused on helping users identify common data
center characteristics that could be detrimental to on-going services and fun-
damental characteristics for long-term stability [13].
The ”Next Generation Data Centers” are improved by understanding
applications in data center and requirement of hosting large scale analytical
clusters. In order to manage latency, those data centers must be agile and
connected to other data centers.
Organizations that build cloud data centers should implement principle
cloud characteristics from Domain 1, add management processes, practices
and software for technology inside the data center, and during that time
improve that processes. On the other hand, cloud customer must be sure
that the provider has established service management processes and practices
to run his data centers, and investigate how provider’s management policies
and procedures will hit their environment.
Domain 9: Incident response
The difficulty to determinate a contact person in case of security incident in
the cloud, makes this domain a guideline on how to use standard incident
response mechanisms with a few modifications. According to CSA, good
incident handling can be reached by understanding the cloud characteristics,
and addressing each of them in a specific phase of the Incident Response
Lifecycle (described in the Computer security incident handling guide (NIST
800-61) [40]). Some characteristics are more challenging for incident response
that the others, like on-demand self-service nature of the cloud which makes
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receiving co-operations with CSP12 very hard, the resource pooling which
may complicate the forensic activities and cause privacy concerns for co-
tenants and crossing the geographic and jurisdiction boundaries [25].
Figure 2.4: IR lifecycle [40]
The Incident Response Lifecycle (Figure 2.4) described in NIST 800-
61 [40], gives the following phases of IR lifecycle and provides recommen-
dation for handling with this challenges: preparation, detection and analy-
sis, containment, eradication and recovery and post-incident activity. The
preparation phase involves constitution of an incident response team and set
of controls based on results of risk assessments. When a security incident is
detected, the process goes into the second phase and alerts the organization
and tries to mitigate the impact by containing and recovering from the inci-
dent. According to the severity of breaches, the process can rotate between
those two phases. The last phase is performed when the incident is handled,
a report is made with details of the cause and cost, and a recommendation
for future prevention of this incident [25] [40].
Domain 10: Application Security
This section gives instructions on how to mitigate risks and manage assurance
within cloud applications, showing the security issues over the lifetime of an
12Cloud service provider
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application – through design and operations until ultimate decommissioning.
Applications can be affected by a few aspects: software development life cycle
(SDLC), application security architecture, compliance, tools and services and
vulnerabilities [13].
Secure SDLC has an important role in deploying an application in a cloud.
Development program must contain the best practice for application secu-
rity, privacy, and identity and data management. When an application is
developed in cloud environment, a few aspects must be taken into consider-
ation: control over physical security in public clouds is very low, protecting
the data through the whole lifecycle must be constant, web services can cause
security vulnerabilities, etc. Configuration management and ongoing provi-
sioning need to be more complex than in traditional deployment and for that
some changes in the architecture need to be done to assure more secure appli-
cation. Also, it is important to support dynamic analysis of web application
security tools for cloud hosted applications, and to monitor the applications
more frequently. For better security, it is also recommended to update threat
and trust models, to update the application assessment tools, to create dif-
ferent trust boundaries for IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. For IaaS, a great security
success can be made with trusted virtual machine images [13] [25].
Domain 11: Encryption and key management
Encryption must be used to protect sensitive data. This domain focuses on
identifying proper encryption usage for resource protection and scalable key
management to enable access to protected resources. The encryption in cloud
computing can be used in some situations [13]:
Encrypting data in transit over networks: There are encrypted data which
transit over the Internet and have multiple identifications, like private
keys, credit card numbers or passwords. This encryption can be equally
applied in SaaS, PaaS and IaaS.
Encrypting data at rest: This is a situation when data are encrypted on
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a disc or in a live production database. It is recommended for the
customer to encrypt his own data before sending it to the cloud. In
this example, the customer can hold and control cryptographic keys
and if it’s necessary decrypt the data on his own device. In IaaS en-
vironment, using some third part tools it is easy to encrypt data at
rest, however, within PaaS this is more complex, and even impossible
in SaaS environment if we don’t have permission from the provider.
Encrypting data on backup media: This is a situation where data is
protected against misuse from stolen or lost media. Although it would
be ideal for the cloud service provider to implement that, it must be
the customers’ concern to do the encryption.
There are two concepts used for encryption, namely content aware and
format preserving encryption. But there are also alternative approaches for
organizations that send out unsecured data: tokenization, data anonymiza-
tion and utilizing cloud database controls [25].
Cloud encryption must be supported by robust key management schemes.
The most common issues and challenges for key management are how to se-
cure and access the key store, and how to make key backup and recoverabil-
ity [13].
Domain 12: Identity and access management
This domain highlights managing identities and providing access control for
cloud applications, with the focus on issues encountered when extending or-
ganization’s identity to the cloud. Cloud-based Identity and access manage-
ment (IAM) is composed of few essential functions: identity provisioning, au-
thentication, federation and authorization and user profile management [13].
Enterprises that need user management processes must extend the secu-
rity and management of on-boarding and off-boarding (provisioning/depro-
visioning) of users in the cloud. It is recommended for customers to leverage
standard connectors build on SPML schema and to modify their authorita-
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tive repositories of identity data. Authentication of users across all types of
cloud services is also a very important requirement for improving security.
In this context, organizations must provide strong (multi-factor) authentica-
tion, delegated authentication and managing trust and credential. Federated
identity management uses organization’s chosen identity provider (IdP) to
help them authenticate their users, in a way which provides single or re-
duced Sign-On (SSO) and secured exchanging identity attributes between
the service provider and the identity provider. Organizations must address
their services with regard to identity lifecycle management, authentication
methods, token formats and non-repudiation. Authorization and user profile
management have many aspects and can vary according to user’s role – as a
consumer or as a member of the organization. Adopting the access control
in SPI environments needs some requirements, including establishing trusted
user profile and policy information [13].
Domain 13: Virtualization
Cloud virtualization brings some benefits like multi-tenancy, data center con-
solidation and better server utilization. However, it also brings all the secu-
rity concerns of the virtualized operation system, as well as new threads [13] [25].
One of the issues is proper protection of virtual machines with firewalls,
antivirus, file integrity and log monitoring and web application protection.
A primary concern of the hypervisor is to establish physical security and
proper management of configuration and operations. Network security is an-
other item on which virtualization has impact. Standard network security
controls cannot perform monitoring or in-line blocking, because today vir-
tual machines communicate over a hardware backplane, and that problem
can be solved with in-line virtual appliance or hardware-assisted virtualiza-
tion. Other issues that this domain focuses on are: performance concerns
arising from CPU and memory used for security, instant-on gaps, data com-
mingling, residential data destruction and difficulty of encrypting virtual
machine images [25].
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Domain 14: Security as a Service
Security as a service (SecaaS) uses adequate tools and expertise to provide
detection, remediation and governance of security infrastructure to a trusted
third party. Until now, cloud security discussions have focused on how to
move to the cloud and provide confidentiality, availability and integrity. This
domain points at Enterprise security. This makes SecaaS different from any
other cloud security [25]. Security as a Service refers to the provision of secu-
rity applications and services via cloud either to cloud-based infrastructure
and software or from the cloud to the customer’s on-premise systems. This
will enable enterprises make security services more cost effective when in the
cloud than provided locally. The following security categories covered in Se-
caaS are of most interest to consumers and security professionals: identity
and access management (IAM), data loss prevention (DLP), web security,
email security, security assessments, intrusion management, security infor-
mation and event management (SIEM), encryption, business continuity and
disaster recovery and network security [41].
2.1.4 Security issues according to SPI
According to infrastructure security in the context of SPI service delivery
model, there are security issues at the network, host and application level.
Infrastructure security is more applicable for IaaS customers, but it can also
be applied for PaaS and SaaS, since they have ramifications to the customers’
risk and compliance management [4].
Network level
At the network level, it is important to distinguish between public clouds and
private clouds. In private clouds, there are no new attacks, vulnerabilities, or
changes in risk that need to be taken into consideration. On the other hand,
in public clouds, the customers’ network topology must interact with cloud
providers’ network topology, which brings changes in security requirements.
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There are a few significant risk factors in this case [4]:
• Ensuring data confidentiality and integrity.
• Ensuring proper access control (authentication, authorization, and au-
diting).
• Ensuring the availability of internet-facing resources.
• Replacing the established model of network zones and tiers with do-
mains.
Data in transit, which flows to and from the public cloud provider, are
exposed to the Internet, and its confidentiality and integrity must be consid-
ered. An example of this is Amazon Web Services (AWS) security vulnera-
bility from December 2008 [42], where the use of HTTP instead of HTTPS
has increased the risk of data modification without customer’s knowledge.
The lack of audit of the operations of cloud provider’s network decreases
customer’s access to relevant network-level logs and data. This risk factor
may produce the issue of reused IP addresses, since the cloud providers do
not “age” IP addresses enough when they are given back. In this way, the
old addresses are still in the DNS caches, and allow users to reach these
non-existing resources.
With the third risk factor mentioned in this section, a few security issues
that need to be considered are highlighted. One of them is BGP13 prefix
hijacking (i.e., the falsification of Network Layer Reachability Information).
Because of the configuration mistake, prefix hijacking is committed by an-
nouncing an autonomous system address space that belongs to someone else
without their permission. As well as misconfigurations, there is also prefix
hijacking due to deliberate attacks. These are rarer than misconfigurations,
but can still block the access to the data. One study presented to the North
American Network Operators Group (NANOG) [44] in February 2006, has
13Border Gateway Protocol – an interdomain routing protocol used in the core of the
Internet [43]
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shown that several hundred misconfigurations occurred per month, and de-
liberate attacks occurred on less occasions than 100 times per month. Prefix
hijacking is not new, but with the increased use of cloud computing, the avail-
ability of cloud-based resources increases as well, which is the target of those
malicious activities. DNS14 attacks are not new and cloud related as well as
the previous attacks, but the issue with cloud computing and DNS presents
a network level security risk because of increased external DNS querying. In
addition to vulnerabilities in the DNS protocol and its implementation, DNS
cache poisoning attacks are big problems in the context of cloud computing.
DNS server is tricked to accept incorrect information on a way that the target
domain’s name server (NS) is redirected, its record is redirected to another
target domain and it’s responded before the real NS. Another consideration
must be added to denial of services (DoS) and distributed denial of services
(DDoS) attacks when using IaaS. Except the external, also internal DDoS
attacks can be provided through the portion of the IaaS provider’s network
used by the customer, and the provider would probably not have any de-
tective controls to notify such an attack. Only customers can prevent those
attacks with hardening its instances and to firewall off groups of instances [4].
Traditional network security relies on isolation model of network zones
and tiers, where users and systems in specific roles have access only to spe-
cific tier or zone. However, this model cannot be applied to the public IaaS
and PaaS clouds, but that approach can be replaced in public clouds with “se-
curity groups”, “security domains” or “virtual data centers”. Those security
groups may allow virtual machines to access each other using a virtual fire-
wall, filtering the traffic based on IP address, packet types and ports. Also,
the applications are logically grouped based on domain names, for example,
Google’s App Engine named its services mytestapp.test.mydomain.com [4].
14Domain Name System [45]
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Host level
The host security issues are closely related to the different cloud service de-
livery models and deployment models. Although there are no new threats
to hosts that are specific to cloud computing, some virtualization security
threats are carried to the public cloud computing environment (VM escape,
system configuration drift and insider threats by way of weak access control
to the hypervisor). The elasticity of the cloud can bring new operational chal-
lenges from a security management perspective, which can be much harder
than just running a scan [4].
SaaS and PaaS host security
Since hackers can use the knowledge about cloud configurations to intrude
into cloud services, cloud service providers are not sharing publicly the infor-
mation about their host platforms, operating systems and processes. In that
way, host security is not known in detail to customers and the whole security
responsibility lies on cloud service provider. Customers can ask CSP to share
information under a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) or via controls assess-
ment framework – ISO 27002 or SysTrust to give customer the assurance.
To provide virtualization, the CSP engages virtualization platform with Xen
and VMware hypervisor included in their host platform architecture. So that
a host abstraction layer is granted, hiding the host operating system from
end users. In the case of SaaS, this layer is only available to developers and
CSP’s operations staff, and in PaaS case, customers use PaaS API that inter-
act with the host abstraction layer. Although the CSP is responsible for host
security for SaaS and PaaS services, customer can own the risk of managing
information hosted in the cloud [4].
IaaS host security
When using IaaS, customers have responsibilities for host security, which
can be categorized as virtualization software security and virtual server se-
curity [4].
Virtualization software security
Managing a virtualization software is assigned to the CSP, while cus-
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tomers do not have access to this software, especially if it is a public cloud
service. Virtualization of hardware or operating system allows sharing of re-
sources across multiple guest virtual machines at the same time and without
interfering between each other. Host level virtualization can be accomplished
using type 1 hypervisors, such as VMware ESX, Xen, Oracle VM and Mi-
crosoft’s Hyper-V.
Virtual server security
Customers have full access to virtual instance of an operating system,
which is visible to them from the Internet and isolated from other instances
by hypervisor technology. For that, the security and security management of
those instances is customer’s responsibility. Public IaaS can be very vulner-
able and cn be a victim of some new host security threads, such as stealing
SSH private keys for host accessing and managing, attacking services listen-
ing on standard ports, hijacking accounts, attacking unsecured systems by
host firewalls and deploying Trojans into virtual OS. For better virtual server
security must use strong operational procedures coupled with automation of
procedures and the following things are recommended:
• Using a secure-by-default configuration – building custom VM images
that have only capabilities and services necessary to support the appli-
cation stack.
• Tracking the inventory of VM image and OS versions that are prepared
for cloud hosting to undertake the same level of security verification and
hardening for hosts within the enterprise.
• Protecting the integrity of an image from unauthorized access.
• Guarding the host access private keys on safe place.
• Guarding the decryption keys out from the cloud where the data is
hosted.
• Except for a key for decrypting the filesystem key, no other authenti-
cation credential should be included.
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• Not using password-based authentication for shell access.
• Periodically reviewing logs for suspicious activities.
Application level
Application security is a critical element of infrastructure security program.
Designing and implementing applications for a cloud platform require im-
proving of current practices and standards for existing application security
programs. Involved applications vary from standalone single-user applica-
tions to sophisticated multiuser e-commerce applications used by millions
of users, but the most vulnerable are web applications. Since browser has
emerged as the end user client for accessing in-cloud applications and they
are vulnerable to end user security attacks, it is important to include browser
security into the scope of application security for achieving end-to-end secu-
rity in the cloud. Hence, customers are recommended to regularly check
browser updates to maintain end user security [4] [46].
Figure 2.5: Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) [4]
According to some researches from SANS [47], web applications vulnera-
bilities accounted for almost half of all critical security controls [48]. OWASP
Top 10 from 2007 [49] to 2013 [50] shows that the main threats for application
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security are SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), broken authentication
and session management, insecure direct object references, malicious file exe-
cution and other vulnerabilities, which are result of programming errors and
design flaws. Web applications built and deployed in a public cloud platform
are easy to scan with appropriate knowledge and tools by hackers, therefore
those applications must be designed for an Internet threat model and security
must be embedded into the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) drawn
with secure design, coding, testing and release. Additionally, application-
level DoS attacks can occur as high-volume web page reloads, XML web
services requests or protocol-specific requests supported by a cloud service.
The most often DoS attacks are on pay-as-you-go cloud applications and will
try to increase the cloud utility bill with huge using of network bandwidth,
CPU and storage. Those types of attacks are known as economic denial of
sustainability (EDoS) [51].
The responsibilities about web application security in the cloud lay on
both the customers and the cloud provider and depend on the cloud ser-
vice delivery model (SPI) and service-level agreement (SLA). In SaaS model,
the service provider is mainly responsible for his own application security,
while the customer is in charge of operational security functions and user
and access management. An interesting problem is the authentication and
access control features offered by SaaS providers. Different providers offer
different methods: web-based administration user interface tool to manage
authentication and access control of the application (Salesforce.com, Google),
built-in features that customers can invoke to assign read and write privileges
to other users (Google Apps). Customers should accept this access control
mechanisms, as well as include strong privilege management based on user
roles and functions and implement a strong password policy [4].
Since PaaS clouds do not only support developing environment, but also
support customer’s own applications, PaaS application security can be di-
vided into two layers: security of the PaaS platform (runtime engine) and
security of customer applications deployed on a PaaS platform. Cloud service
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providers are responsible for securing the platform software stack or to guar-
anty that the third-party application provider secures their services. They are
also responsible for monitoring new bugs and vulnerabilities and monitoring
of a shared network and system infrastructure of a customer’s applications.
PaaS developers need to understand the specific cloud providers’ APIs and
its security features – security objects and web services for setting up au-
thentication and authorization tools within applications. On the other hand,
it is expected from the cloud service provider to offer user authentication,
single sign-on (SSO) using federation, authorization and SSl or TLS support.
Since there is no PaaS security management standard, security features and
models can vary between providers [4].
In IaaS clouds, customers have complete control over securing their ap-
plications, because the entire stack runs on customer’s virtual servers, and
from cloud provider they should receive only basic guidance referring to fire-
wall policy. Web applications deployed into the public IaaS cloud must be
designed for an Internet thread model, and should be periodically tested for
vulnerabilities and security must be embedded into the SDLC. IaaS devel-
opers need to implement their own features to handle authentication and
authorization and should make their application supportive for authentica-
tion service features by an enterprise Identity Provider or third-party identity
service provider.
2.2 Data security
2.2.1 Data life cycle
The idea of protecting data in the cloud is similar to traditional data se-
curity, but because of openness and multitenant characteristic of the cloud,
the content of cloud data security has its particularities. The problem of
keeping data secure and confidential is shown through the Data Security
Lifecycle [20] [8].
Data lifecycle refers to the entire process from generation to destruction
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Figure 2.6: Data Security Lifecycle [39]
of the data. The data life cycle is divided into six stages [39] [25]:
Create
Creation is the generation of new or modifying the existing digital data
element, so can be named also as Create/Update phase. It can be every
kind of content, not just a document or database, and can be either
structured or unstructured. In this phase the information is classified
and the appropriate rights are determined.
Store
Storing is the act committing the digital data to structured or unstruc-
tured sort of storage repository (database vs. files) and usually occurs
simultaneously with creation. Here the classification and rights to se-
curity controls are mapped, including access controls, encryption and
rights management.
Use
Data is viewed, processed, or otherwise used in some sort of activity,
not including modification. These controls apply to data at the point
of use- typically a user’s PC or an application. There are detective
controls like activity monitoring, preventative controls like rights man-
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agement and logical controls which are typically applied in databases
and applications.
Share
Data is made accessible to others and is exchanged between users, cus-
tomers, and partners. These controls include a mix of detective and
preventative controls, encryption for secure exchange of data, and log-
ical controls and application security.
Archive
Data leaves active use and enters long-term storage. Here, the pro-
tection of data and its availability is ensured with a combination of
encryption and asset management.
Destroy
Data is permanently destroyed using physical or digital means (e.g.,
crypto-shredding). The data must be deleted securely and need to be
used tools to track down any lingering copies.
Locations and access
One significant gap in the data lifecycle is that it doesn’t adequately show
the location of the data when is moving between repositories, environments
and organizations and how it is accessed during the phases.
The role of the location can be represented by thinking of the lifecycle
as a series of smaller lifecycles running in different operating environments
and not as a single, linear operation. Data can be moved into, out of, and
between these environments at any phase of data lifecycle. Strong data secu-
rity can be achieved by identifying these movements and applying the right
controls at the right security boundaries. These locations may be internal,
external, public or private cloud, cloud provider or traditional outsourcers
etc., and for that it is extremely important to understand both the logical
and physical locations of data, due to the potential regulatory, contractual
and other jurisdictional issues.
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Figure 2.7: The role of the location into the Data Security Lifecycle [39]
For fully completing the data lifecycle, despite location it is needed to be
known who have access to the data and how can they access it (device and
channel). Data can be accessed from different devices which have different
security characteristics and may use different applications or clients [39].
Functions, actors and controls
The last step for completing data lifecycle is to add functions that can be
performed with the data, by a given actor and on a particular location. An
actor can be a person, application or system, as opposed to an access device.
The actor can perform three functions [39]:
Access: View/access the data, including copying, file transfers, and other
exchanges of information.
2.2. DATA SECURITY 39
Figure 2.8: Completing the data lifecycle with functions, actors and con-
trols [39]
Process: Perform a transaction on the data: update it, use it in a business
processing transaction, etc.
Store: Hold the data (in a file, database, etc.).
The table below shows which functions map to which phases of the life-
cycle:
Figure 2.9: Mapping the functions into the different phases of the lifecy-
cle [39]
A control restricts a list of possible actions down to allowed actions. For
example, encryption can be used to restrict access to data, application con-
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trols to restrict processing via authorization, and DRM storage to prevent
unauthorized accesses [39].
2.2.2 Aspects of data security
Ensuring data safety in the cloud requires different approaches and good
understanding of different stages of data transmission [4]:
• data in transit,
• data at rest,
• processing of data, including multitenancy,
• data lineage,
• data provenance,
• data remanence.
The first three stages can be compared trivially with example of using
an email, where sending an email represents data in transit, data at rest
is the email in the mailbox and processing of data refers to typing up a
response [52].
It is recommended to protect the data in transit using vetted encryption
algorithm, especially when using a public cloud. Using encrypted data with
a non-secured protocol can provide confidentiality, but does not ensure the
integrity of the data. Hence, it is essential to use a protocol that will provide
integrity as well, such as FTP over SSL (FTPS), Hypertext Transfer Protocol
Secure (HTTPS) or Secure Copy Program (SCP) [4].
Encrypting data at rest is not as simple as data in transit. Encryption is
possible when using an IaaS cloud service for simple storage, but using en-
cryption in PaaS and SaaS cloud application is not always feasible, because
it prevents indexing and searching of that data. However, when applica-
tions work with data processing, this data must be unencrypted, and that
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is a scenario where the organization’s data are definitely not encrypted. For
now, a fully homomorphic encryption scheme is being developed [53] which
allows data to be processed without being decrypted, although some earlier
researches shows that homomorphic encryption required immense computa-
tional effort [54].
When data are in the cloud, it is recommended to follow its history, to
know exactly where and when the data were located within the cloud. A
data lineage analysis can be performed with ETL15 tools and can track data
alterations by presenting a series of data output-input dependencies within
such an environment as a graph of nodes and links [55]. This data path
visualization is known as data lineage. Although providing data lineage is
very important for auditor’s assurance, this process is time-consuming and
for a public cloud it is not really possible [4].
A more challenging problem for the customers is providing data prove-
nance, which means not just proving the integrity of the data, but more spe-
cific provenance of the data. Data provenance represents a sort of metadata,
containing the derivation history of a data product starting from its original
sources in a data warehouse, track the creation of intellectual property and
provide an audit trail for regulatory purposes [56].
A final aspect of data security is data remanence – the residual represen-
tation of digital data that remains even after attempts to remove or erase
the data. Some operating systems do not delete the data immediately when
the user requests that, but move it to a holding area for easily recover from a
possible crash or mistake. This residue may be due to data being left intact
by a nominal delete operation or through physical properties of the storage
medium that allow previously written data to be recovered. Data remanence
may make inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information possible, if a stor-
age media would be released into an uncontrolled environment (e.g., thrown
in the trash, or lost) [57].
15Extract, Transform and Load
42 CHAPTER 2. CLOUD SECURITY
Cloud computing with its virtualization characteristic complicates data
remanence. Overwriting the physical media is virtually impossible, since the
cloud infrastructure may distribute customer’s storage or virtual machine
instance across multiple physical drives. Furthermore, the data written on
particular drives remain until cloud provider reallocates those sectors to other
instances, which allow hackers to read this data by looking at the bits in the
new instance. For this problem, the first recommendation is to encrypt data
before it is stored within the cloud. For the keys, it is recommended to be
managed locally. Using these recommendations, data can be securely deleted
simply by deleting the key. This approach is sufficient if cloud is used only
for storing the encrypted data, not to process it, since the data need to be
decrypted [58].
From the aforementioned, it can be said that the only workable option for
data security mitigating is to ensure that the sensitive data won’t be stored
into a public cloud, or if it must, to be used encryption with locally keeping
keys.
Chapter 3
Cryptography deployment in
clouds
3.1 Cryptographic cloud storage
An important aspect of a cryptographic storage service is that the security
properties like confidentiality, integrity, availability, are achieved based on
strong cryptographic guarantees, which is different than in legal, physical
and access control mechanisms. Cloud storage can be categorized into two
classes: cloud storages that are designed using cryptographic techniques but
not in the framework of cryptography theory (Class-A), and cloud storages
that are designed using cryptographic techniques and also in the framework
of cryptography theory (Class-B). Class-B schemes were proven secure in the
framework of provable-security theory in cryptography field and an example
of these schemes are Kamara et al.’s and Chow et al.’s scheme. A few Class-
A schemes are known today: Kamara et al.’s scheme, Barua et al.’s scheme,
Kumbhare et al.’s scheme, Zarandioon et al.’s work, Somorovsky et al.’s
scheme etc. [59].
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3.1.1 Kamara et al.’s scheme
The best known storage scheme is Kamara et al.’s scheme [60]. Kamara shows
a possible architecture for a cryptographic storage service and describes de-
signs for both consumer and enterprise scenarios by using non-standard cryp-
tographic techniques, such as attributed encryption, searchable encryption,
etc. The architecture contains three components: data processor (DP) that
processes data before it is sent to the cloud, data verifier (DV), that checks
whether the data in the cloud has been tampered with, and a token gener-
ator (TG) that generates tokens which enable the cloud storage provider to
retrieve segments of customer data [60].
Architecture for consumer scenario
Cryptographic cloud storage in consumer scenario includes a user Alice, the
owner of the data in the cloud, a user Bob, and a cloud storage provider. In
this scenario Alice wants to share data with Bob (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Architecture for consumer scenario [60]
First, Alice’s data processor prepares the data before sending it to the
cloud, generates cryptographic key (master key) which is expected to be
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stored locally, attaches some metadata, encrypts the data with a variety of
cryptographic primitives, and encodes the encrypted data and index. To
share the data with Bob, Alice’s token generator creates a token for the key-
word and a decryption key, which are sent to Bob. Then he sends the token
to the cloud, and the provider uses it to retrieve the requested encrypted
files and returns them to Bob. After receiving the file from the cloud, Bob
can use decryption key to decrypt the files and use them. No matter what
phase the process is in, data integrity can be always verified by Alice’s data
verifier [60].
Architecture for enterprise scenario
Cryptographic cloud storage in enterprise scenario includes an enterprise
MegaCorp that is owner of the data in the cloud, a business partner Partner-
Corp, and a cloud storage provider. This architecture is extended with new
component, a credential generator (CG), who implements an access control
policy by issuing credentials to parties inside and outside MegaCorp (Fig-
ure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Architecture for enterprise scenario [60]
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Each MegaCorp and PartnerCorp employee receives a credential from
the credential generator, which can be their organization, team or role, and
send the data to the dedicated machine along with an associated decryption
policy (only members of a particular team can decrypt the data). As in the
consumer scenario, the data processor prepares the data before sending it
to the cloud. The PartnerCorp employee authenticates itself and sends a
keyword to a MegaCorp’s dedicated machine when he needs access to the
data. Than the employee is checked if he has the appropriate role to access
the data, and if this succeeds, the dedicated machine returns a token. This
token is used by cloud to find the encrypted documents and returns them to
the employee. After that, the employee uses his credentials to decrypt the
file. At any point in time, MegaCorp’s data verifier can verify the integrity
of MegaCorp’s data [60].
Implementation and benefits
Some of the cryptographic techniques used in this architecture are developed
specifically for cloud computing. The data processor uses symmetric encryp-
tion scheme (e.g. AES) under unique key for data indexing and encrypting.
Next, the data processor encrypts the index using a searchable encryption
scheme and the unique key using attribute-based encryption scheme. Fi-
nally, the whole data is encoded in a way that the data verifier can verify the
integrity using a proof of storage.
The main benefits of using this cryptographic storage service are that the
control of the data is maintained by the customer and the security properties
are derived from cryptography, as opposed to legal mechanisms, physical se-
curity or access control. Moreover, this approach satisfies the main concerns
from the Cloud Security Alliance’s reports, such as: regulatory compliance,
geographic restrictions, subpoenas, security breaches, electronic discovery,
data retention and destruction [60].
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3.1.2 Barua et al.’s scheme
Considering the problem of patient self-controlled access privilege to highly
sensitive Personal Health Information (PHI), Barua proposed access control
scheme for cloud storage, known as efficient and secure patient-centric ac-
cess control (ESPAC) scheme, based on ciphertext-policy attributed-based
encryption and identity-based encryption. This scheme allows users to have
different access privileges according to its roles, and then assigns different
attributes sets to them [59].
This model contains some entities: trusted authority (TA) generates the
public and secret key parameters for the ESPAC and grants differential access
rights to individual users based on their attributes and roles, cloud service
provider, registered user – patient, who is responsible for encrypting the
sensitive PHI and data-access requester – cloud user, who wants to access
some specific PHI [61].
ESPAC scheme
In the ESPAC scheme, there are two major phases as shown in Figure 3.3.
In phase A, a secure data communication between different eHealt users is
established with identity-based encryption scheme. In phase B, an attribute
based encryption scheme is employed to realize control of data requester’s
access.
In the phase-A, the communication between a remote user and an eHealth
service provider follows the next steps [61]:
Step 1 (System initialization): The cloud service provider receives a unique
ID by a trusted authority, computes the public key, generates the hash
function and computes the key for message encryption and decryption.
After that it generates secure hash functions and remote user’s pseudo-
identity and sends them to its subscribers. Trusted authority computes
public and master key for attribute-based encryption and decryption.
The individual user computes the public key, the session key and the
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Figure 3.3: ESPAC scheme [61]
message token and along with the encrypted data sends them to the
receiver.
Step 2 (Secure message communication): After the system initializa-
tion, both parties use data encryption and decryption algorithms to
securely transmit their data.
Step 3 (Message signature and verification): After receiving the mes-
sage, the receiver will verify it to ensure data integrity with crypto-
graphic digital signature. By doing so, the eHealth service provider
can verify the data originated from the specific patient and cannot be
altered after signing it.
In the phase-B, an access tree is created, based on different roles of data
requesters. The requester can decrypt the PHI data only with a secret key,
which can be obtained if they provide the corresponding attributes - nodes
of the access tree. The access tree classifies the data requesters as health
workers, physicians, researchers, insurance companies, etc., and each of them
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Figure 3.4: Access structures based on different privacy levels [61]
has a specific area of interest. Figure 3.4 shows possible access structures
based on different privacy levels, where intermediate nodes work as logic
gates. For example, “2 of (location, gender, disease)” in Figure 3.4(a) can be
converted to “(location AND gender) OR (gender AND disease) OR (disease
AND location)” [61].
From a security aspect, it can be said that ESPAC scheme satisfies some
main security concerns: the ESPAC scheme ensures user and eHealth agent’s
identity privacy, is secure against chosen ciphertext-only attack, is resistant
to eavesdropping and collusion attacks, the scheme ensures message integrity,
non-repudiation, and source authentication, ensures backward and forward
secrecy, etc [61].
3.1.3 Kumbhare et al. scheme
Kumbhare presents the Cryptonite architecture for a secure data repository
service design on top of a public cloud infrastructure. The scheme allows
secure storing and sharing of the cloud data, without revealing the plain
text to unauthorized users. The system masks file names, user permissions
and access patterns while providing auditing capabilities with provable data
updates [59].
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Figure 3.5: Entities and roles in Kumbhare’s scheme [62]
In this model, a few entities and roles are defined(Figure 3.5): user, which
can be categorized as “owner”, authorized user (“Reader” or “Writer”) or
unauthorized user, cloud storage service provider for storing the files, and
secure data repository (Cryptonite), which uses the cloud storage service as
the backend store and manages user accounts and enforces access rights [62].
Cryptonite architecture
The Cryptonite Architecture integrates client-side libraries with the secure
data repository service and existing cloud storage service to support the
operations: PUT, GET, DELETE, GRANT, REVOKE, and SEARCH (Fig-
ure 3.6).
The Cryptonite Client Library (CCL) has in authority to encrypt and pre-
process the plain text files before uploading them to the Cryptonite repository
service, and to decrypt it upon receipt. The client library runs on the user’s
local machine and forms the secure operations provided by Cryptonite. The
Cryptonite Data Repository Service runs within a Cloud VM and has three
major subcomponents: the File Manager (FM), the Secure Index Manager
(SIM) and the Audit Manager (AM). The File Manager has responsibility to
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Figure 3.6: Cryptonite Architecture [62]
interact with the Cloud storage service to store and retrieve files requested
by the user, or to restrict unauthorized updates to the stored data. The
Audit Manager maintains a secure audit log for each file access performed
by the File Manager, including a signature of the requested operation’s mes-
sage. The Secure Index Manager (SIM) keeps a secure index per user for
all the files that are owned by that user, and stores this index in a separate
Secure Index Storage (SIS) space. The Cryptonite Secure Storage (CSS) is
a storage account within the public cloud used to store the files and meta-
data. The CSS uses standard authentication mechanisms provided by cloud
data services to access this space and use it to store at collection of binary
files [62].
Implementation and benefits
Cryptonite uses several cryptographic and security techniques in its secure
design: public key infrastructure (PKI), digital signature, broadcast encryp-
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tion, lazy revocation and searchable encryption. Public key infrastructure is
used to provide User Identity to each user and to allow the user to associate
the public/private key pair with that identity. Digital signature is deployed
in file manager and audit manager for the purposes of integrity verification
as well as auditing purpose. Broadcast encryption is deployed in Cryptonite
client library and allows users to encrypt their data in a way that it can be
decrypted only by a particular subset of users. Lazy revocation is a strategy
in which a file, that has read access rights for a user removed by its owner, is
not re-encrypted unless the file’s contents change. Searchable encryption is
deployed in the secure index manager to allow searching within an encrypted
file without decrypting the entire file [62].
This cloud architecture scenario addressed a few security issues: data
storage security, metadata storage security, owner control of data sharing,
data integrity and audit, masking access control list, masking access patterns,
assured file deletion, etc [59].
3.1.4 Other cloud storage schemes
Zarandioon et al.’s work
Zarandioon proposed a user-centric privacy-preserving cryptographic access
control protocol called key to cloud (K2C) [63], using attributed-based en-
cryption and signature. This protocol allowing end-users anonymously and
securely to store, share, and manage their sensitive data in untrusted cloud
storage (Figure 3.7).
In meta-data directory, all hierarchies and data objects have access revi-
sion for reading and writing. Attribute-based cryptography is applied right
in these components to realize access control [59].
Somorovsky et al.’s scheme
Somorovsky proposed a secure solution Sec2 [64] for distributed public cloud
storage by using extensive makeup language (XML) encryption, which system
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Figure 3.7: K2C Architecture [63]
architecture is showed in the Figure 3.8. XML encryption is used in XML
encryption engine which is responsible for encryption and decryption of XML
payload and key data [59].
Popa et al. scheme
Popa [65] proposes a secure cloud storage system – CloudProof, trying to fix
lack of security guarantees in service level agreements (SLAs) of cloud storage
systems. This system can allow users not only to detect violations of integrity,
write-serializability, and freshness, but also to prove the occurrence of these
violations to a third party. This cloud storage can be implemented based
on conventional cloud storage services. Furthermore, the system address
broadcast encryption and key rolling to achieve key distribution in access
control of CloudProof [59].
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Figure 3.8: Sec2 Architecture [64]
Ruj et al.’s work
Ruj’s work [66] addresses the design of access control in cloud storage. A
distributed access control (DACC) is ensured by employing attribute-based
encryption. In DACC, cloud knows the access structure used by the owner
and the attributes of the users, and the revocation of users is allowed without
redistributing decryption keys to all the users in the network [59].
Group encryption
Group encryption [67] is a useful cryptographic primitive in the scenario
whenever a recipient within a group of legitimate receivers needs to be con-
cealed. To correct the weakness that some vulnerabilities can potentially
lead to disputation in cloud storage services, Feng [68] proposed a multi-
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party non-repudiation (MPNR) protocol by using group encryption that is
specifically designed for the cloud storage environment. This protocol fo-
cuses on how to ensure integrity with fair non-repudiation. Later, based on
the same cryptographic technique, Feng et al. [69] further proposed a fair
multi-party non-repudiation (MPNR) using group encryption to solve the
problems of fair non-repudiation and roll-back attacks [59].
Kamara et al.’s scheme (Cloud storage of Class-B)
By using symmetric searchable encryption (SSE), search authenticators and
proofs of storage (PoS), Kamara [70] proposed a cloud storage system CS2
from a cryptographic standpoint. CS2 can ensure confidentiality, integrity,
and verifiability without sacrificing utility. In this system, SSE is used to
encrypt data by a client so that it can later generate search tokens for a
storage provider, and the search authenticator is used by the cloud provider
to prove to the client that it returned the correct files only [59].
Chow et al.’s scheme (Cloud storage of Class-B)
Chow [71] proposed secure cloud storage with properties of data provenance
and support of dynamic users from the cryptographic standpoint. This
security model is based on cryptography theory which includes confiden-
tiality, anonymity, and traceability. The security of Chow et al.’s scheme
can be proven under some number-theoretical assumptions in the frame-
work of provable-security theory in cryptography field. Moreover, Chow et
al.’s scheme is pairing-based cryptographic cloud storage and designed us-
ing VLR (verifier-local revocation) group signature scheme and a variant of
identity-based broadcast encryption [59].
56 CHAPTER 3. CRYPTOGRAPHY DEPLOYMENT IN CLOUDS
3.2 Cryptographic techniques for cloud com-
puting
3.2.1 Searchable Encryption
This encryption scheme provides encrypting a search index generated over a
collection of files, in a way that its contents are hidden except to a party that
has appropriate tokens. Using a searchable encryption scheme, the index is
encrypted in such a way that the pointers to the encrypted files that contain
the keyword can be retrieved by a given token for a keyword and without
a token the contents of the index are hidden. In addition, the tokens can
only be generated with knowledge of a secret key. The retrieval procedure
reveals nothing about the files or the keywords except that the files con-
tain a keyword in common. There are many types of searchable encryption
schemes: symmetric, asymmetric, efficient and multi-user symmetric search-
able encryption [60].
Symmetric searchable encryption
SSE (introduced in Song, Wagner and Perrig 2000 [72]) is appropriate in any
setting where the party that searches over the data is also the one who gen-
erates it, referring to such scenarios as single writer/single reader (SWSR).
SSE schemes are based on symmetric primitives like block ciphers and
pseudo-random functions and typical usage scenarios allow the data to be
pre-processed and stored in efficient data structures. A SSE scheme is a set
of four polynomial-time algorithms: Keygen, BuildIndex, Trapdoor, Search.
Keygen(1k) is a probabilistic key generation algorithm, which is run by a user
to setup the scheme and takes a security parameter k and returns a secret key
K. BuildIndex (K,D) is an algorithm run by a user to generate indexes and as
inputs it takes a secret key K and a document collection D. Trapdoor(K,w)
is run by a user to generate a trapdoor for a given word and takes a secret
key K and a word w as inputs and returns a trapdoor Tw. Search(I, Tw) is
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run by a server S in order to find the word w into the document collection
D [73].
The main advantages of SSE are efficiency and security while the main
disadvantage is functionality. SSE schemes are efficient both for the party
doing the encryption and for the party performing the search. The main
disadvantage of SSE is known solutions trade off efficiency and functionality.
The search time for the server is optimal, but updates to the index are
inefficient [73]. On the other hand, in the scheme proposed by Goh [74],
updates to the index can be done efficiently but search time for the server is
slow [60].
Asymmetric searchable encryption
ASE schemes (introduced in Boneh 2004 [75] and improved in Abdalla 2005 [76],
Park 2005 [77] and Boneh 2007 [78]) are appropriate in any setting where
the party searching over the data is different from the party that generates
it, referring to such scenarios as many writer/single reader (MWSR).
ASE schemes consist of the following polynomial time randomized al-
gorithms: KeyGen(s), run by the user, takes a security parameter s, and
create public/private key pair Apub, Apriv; PEKS (Apub;W)
1 which produces
a searchable encryption of a word W; Trapdoor(Apriv;W) to produce a trap-
door TW for any keywords W that user wants the server to search for, and
Test(Apub; S; TW) algorithm to determine whether a given document contains
one of the keywords W specified by the user [75].
The main advantage of ASE is functionality - ASE schemes are usable in
a larger number of settings than SSE schemes. The main disadvantages are
inefficiency and weaker security, because all known ASE schemes require the
evaluation of pairings on elliptic curves which is a relatively slow operation
compared to evaluations of cryptographic hash functions or block ciphers [60].
1Public Key Encryption with keyword Search
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Efficient ASE
ESE schemes [79] are appropriate in any setting where the party that searches
over the data is different from the party that generates it and where the
keywords are hard to guess (MWSR scenario). The main advantage of ESE
is that search is more efficient than ASE, and the main disadvantage is that
ESE schemes are also vulnerable to dictionary attacks [60].
Multi-user SSE (mSSE)
mSSE schemes [73] are appropriate in any setting where many parties wish
to search over data that is generated by a single party, referring to such
scenarios as single writer/many reader (SWMR). The owner of the data also
can add and revoke users’ search privileges over his data [60].
3.2.2 Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption was introduced in Sahai and Waters 2005 [80]
and is also known as fuzzy identity-based encryption, where an identity is
a set of descriptive attributes (e.g., roles, age, relationship, trust, location,
etc.).
This encryption is a set of cryptographic techniques that allow the speci-
fication of a decryption policy to be associated with a cipher text – each user
in the system is provided with a decryption key that has a set of attributes
associated with it. A user can then encrypt a message under a public key
and a policy. ABE uses a tree-based access structure, which allows the en-
cryptor to specify which attributes can decrypt the data. Decryption will be
possible only if the attributes associated with the decryption key match the
policy used for encryption. The tree-based access structure uses operators
such as AND, OR and k-of-n, where AND is usually known as n of n and
OR is known as 1 of n [81].
ABE was improved with two types of variant of ABE scheme: key-policy
attribute based encryption (KP-ABE) [82] and cipher-policy attribute based
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encryption (CP-ABE) [83].
3.2.3 Proofs of Storage
A proof of storage is a protocol executed between a client and a server,
which allows a client to verify that a server faithfully stores a file. Proofs
of storage can be constructed from any homomorphic linear authenticator
(HLA). Proofs of storage were introduced in Ateniese 2007 [84] and Juels
2007 [85] and improved in Shacham 2008 [86], Ateniese 2009 [87] and Erway
2009 [88].
Before storing the data on the cloud, the client encodes it, and after
that, whenever it wants to verify the integrity of the data it runs a proof of
storage protocol with the server. The main benefits of a proof of storage are
that they can be executed an arbitrary number of times and the amount of
information exchanged between the client and the server is extremely small
and independent of the size of the data.
Proofs of storage can be either privately or publicly verifiable. Privately
verifiable proofs of storage only allow the client to verify the integrity of the
data. With a publicly verifiable proof of storage, on the other hand, anyone
that possesses the client’s public key can verify the data’s integrity [60].
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Chapter 4
DropBoxCrypt Application
4.1 Application purpose and specification
Cloud computing has been expanding its influence in mobile computing
practices. Thousands of mobile applications integrate various cloud storage
providers into their software, allowing users to store data in the cloud. How-
ever, when a security issue is in question, the cryptography must be taken
into consideration. While there are countless data encryption and decryption
tools available across most popular computer platforms, choices are rather
limited for mobile users. Android is no exception in this regard. There are
some applications that have integrated the encryption and decryption func-
tionality on Android devices, such as Cryptonite and Boxcryptor. Those
applications add an extra level of protection, but from a security and perfor-
mance perspective, they need to be improved. The purpose of this chapter
is to show how we can protect our cloud data through our application via
our mobile devices, and to propose a new approach to user authentication,
enabled by new technical developments.
DropBoxCrypt application represents a data encryption tool for mobile
devices that can be used to browse files, to encrypt the chosen files and to
upload them into the Dropbox storage and to decrypt them when they are
downloaded. Thus, users can store data in the cloud in a secure manner.
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Our application is developed in Android Studio v.1.3.2 which is com-
patible with Android devices using API 23. It connects with our Dropbox
storage using its Dropbox API. Dropbox uses OAuth 2, an open specifica-
tion for user’s authentication and making secure communication between the
mobile application and the cloud storage. Before decrypting the file, we au-
thenticate the user with their fingerprint, a feature that is allowed in the last
Android version – Android 6 Marshmallow, where the Fingerprint API is in-
troduced. The code is available on https://github.com/ikostadinovska/
dropboxcrypt.
4.2 Use – case scenarios
The first step in using this application is to make a user authentication.
Within the main window, we connect the application with our Dropbox ac-
count. There are two use-case scenarios: upload and download file.
4.2.1 Upload file
If we want to upload a file, we choose the Upload button. After that, we
search through the file system and choose a file that we want to upload into
the cloud. When this is done, the application makes encryption to that file
and sends it like that to the Dropbox. At the same time, a .key file is made
for future decryption and stored on the device storage.
4.2.2 Download file
If we want to download a file from the Dropbox storage, we choose the
Download button. At this stage, the application shows another view for
fingerprint authentication and prompts us to touch the fingerprint sensor.
Then the application starts listening for a fingerprint. When the fingerprint
is available, the application checks if a fingerprint or a system password exists.
The fingerprint dialogue also allows the use of a backup password, if it is our
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choice, or in the case of a hardware error. After successful authentication, the
user is redirected to the Dropbox storage. From the /Apps/DropBoxCrypt/
folder we choose the wanted file. The file is downloaded to the phone storage,
the appropriate .key file is found and the decryption is done. Before using
this application, the fingerprint must be registered on the device with its
backup password.
4.3 Application development
4.3.1 Application structure and architecture
The application consists of several activities (Figure 4.1):
MainActivity links the whole application together and gives the applica-
tion its basic view. Here the connection with Dropbox is done, using
OAuth protocol with OAuth2 and OAuth1 access token. In the onAc-
tivityResult() method, in case that we choose a file from dropbox, we
authenticate with our fingerprint in the onRequestPermissionsResult()
method, which handles the permissions. After permission is granted,
we make a DownloadFile object, which is used to download the selected
file. In case we choose a file from the phone storage, we make DataEn-
cryptionCrypto object to encrypt the chosen file, and UploadFile object
to send that file to the dropbox.
DownloadFile is a class for downloading the selected file from the Dropbox
storage. When we reach the file, we create DataEncryptionCrypto
object to decrypt the file.
UploadFile is a class for uploading a file into the Dropbox (encryption is
already made before in MainActivity).
DataEncryptionCrypto contains encryptFile() and decryptFile() meth-
ods. For its purpose we use javax.crypto with its Chiper and SecretKey
classes with AES 128.
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KeyStoreUtils is used for managing the keys, and is compose of gener-
ateKey(), saveKey() and loadKey() methods.
FingerprintAuthenticationDialogFragment handles the dialog which
uses fingerprint APIs to authenticate the user.
FingerprintUiHelper is a small helper class that manages text and icon
for fingerprint authentication UI.
FingerprintModule is a dagger module for Fingerprint APIs.
InjectedApplication is a class of the sample that holds the ObjectGraph
in Dagger and enables dependency injection.
The application also has two subprojects:
aFileChooser chooses files from the phone storage.
dropboxChooserSDK searches and selects files into the Dropbox storage.
The Chooser [89] is the fastest way to get files from Dropbox into third-
part application. It’s a small JavaScript component that enables our
application to get files from Dropbox without having to worry about the
complexities of implementing a file browser, authentication, or manag-
ing uploads and storage.
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Figure 4.1: UML Class Diagram for DropBoxCrypt application
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4.3.2 Application Flowchart
The following steps illustrate how DropBoxCrypt application works (Fig-
ure 4.2):
1. User enters the application.
I Application connects to Dropbox API.
i. Application checks if the right Dropbox application key is
used.
II Application waits for user’s commands.
2. User attempts to log in into Dropbox.
I Application firstly checks if the user has been logged out from
previous session.
II Application requires user’s credentials for login process.
3. User enters username and password.
I Application checks user’s credentials.
i. Remote OAuth2 authentication starts.
II User logs in.
III Application waits for user’s further commands.
4. User attempts to upload file to Dropbox.
I Upload process starts.
II When upload process is done, application returns back to home
screen.
5. User attempts to download file from Dropbox.
I Download process starts.
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II When downloading is done, application returns back to home
screen.
6. User attempts to log out.
I Application checks if the user is still logged in.
i. Application removes user’s credentials from the current ses-
sion.
II User logs out.
III Application returns back to home screen.
The following steps illustrate the Upload process (Figure 4.3):
1. Application shows a file chooser.
I User selects a file for the upload process.
II Application uses file path of the targeted file.
2. Application encrypts the selected file.
I Application sets the block size.
i. Application creates file’s key.
ii. Application creates cryptographic cipher for encryption and
decryption using AES.
II Application uses encrypted file’s file path.
3. Application uploads the encrypted file to Dropbox’s storage.
The following steps illustrate the Download process (Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5
and Figure 4.6):
1. During the initialization, Android device checks application’s permis-
sions stored in application’s Manifest file.
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Figure 4.2: UML Sequence Diagram for DropBoxCrypt application
I Application checks if a fingerprint is already registered in the de-
vice.
i. If not, application requires user to register his fingerprint.
ii. Fingerprint is set up.
II Application creates key and stores into Android’s Key Store.
2. User requires retrieving a file from Dropbox.
I Application opens an authentication dialog which provides finger-
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Figure 4.3: UML Sequence Diagram for Upload
print and password based authentications.
i. If the user scans his fingerprint, the application checks for
fingerprints accessibility.
A. If the fingerprints are accessible, application tries to match
user’s fingerprint to other available fingerprints.
B. If the stored fingerprints are not accessible, application
asks user to enter backup password.
ii. If the user enters system password, application proceeds to
password authentication.
A. If the password is available, application tries to authenti-
cate the user.
II If authentication is unsuccessful, application returns back to home
screen.
III If authentication is successful, application shows Dropbox file chooser.
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i. User selects his desired file.
ii. Application takes targeted file’s file path.
iii. Application retrieves the encrypted file.
IV Application decrypts the file.
i. Application sets up the block size.
ii. Decrypted file is available in the phone storage.
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Figure 4.4: UML Sequence diagram for Download - I
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Figure 4.6: UML Sequence diagram for Download - III
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4.3.3 Dropbox Security
When we start building an app on the Dropbox Platform [90] [91], we first
need to obtain app permissions. For this purpose, we register a Dropbox
app in the App Console [92], where we need to choose the right permission
(access type) for our application. In the App Console an App key and App
secret are created, and they are needed to link our application with Dropbox
API. A dedicated folder named after our application is created within the
Apps folder of a user’s Dropbox and the content of our application is moved
into this folder. We provide the app key and secret and pass both values to
the new DropboxAPI object like in the Source code 4.1.
Source code 4.1: Get application permissions
private static final String APP_KEY = "4b0fdj4re09sy62";
private static final String APP_SECRET = "9ghy3js86qmjul0";
DropboxAPI<AndroidAuthSession> mApi;
AppKeyPair appKeyPair = new AppKeyPair(APP_KEY, APP_SECRET);
AndroidAuthSession session = new AndroidAuthSession(appKeyPair);
mApi = new DropboxAPI<AndroidAuthSession>(session);
Dropbox uses OAuth 2 [93] for user authentication in Dropbox and gives
permission to the application to access user’s data on Dropbox. Once the
user proves his identity, the OAuth process returns an access token to our
app and we need to send it with each subsequent API request to uniquely
identify both, our application and the end user. With OAuth there is no
need for storing and transmitting the user’s Dropbox password, which makes
OAuth a safer and more secure form of API authorization for our users. Au-
thentication flow starts by calling the startOAuth2Authentication() method
(Source code 4.2).
Source code 4.2: Uses of OAuth 2 for user authentication on Dropbox
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mApi.getSession().startOAuth2Authentication(MainActivity.this);
To finish authentication after the user returns to the application, we need
Source code 4.3.
Source code 4.3: Uses of OAuth 2 for user authentication on Dropbox
protected void onResume() {
super.onResume();
AndroidAuthSession session = mApi.getSession();
if (session.authenticationSuccessful()) {
try {
session.finishAuthentication();
storeAuth(session);
setLoggedIn(true);
} catch (IllegalStateException e) {
showToast("Couldn’t authenticate with Dropbox:" +
e.getLocalizedMessage());
}
}
}
To upload a file in the Dropbox storage, we need to use the putFile()
method. putFile makes a network call, so we have to make sure to invoke
it on a background thread. It takes a path pointing to where we want the
file in our Dropbox, an InputStream to be uploaded there, and the input’s
length (Source code 4.4).
Source code 4.4: Uploading a file in the Dropbox storage
protected Boolean doInBackground(Void... params) {
try {
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(mFile);
String path = mPath + mFile.getName();
mRequest = mApi.putFile(path, fis, mFile.length(),
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To download a file we use the opposite method getFile() (Source code 4.5).
Source code 4.5: Downloading a file from the Dropbox storage
protected Boolean doInBackground(Void... params) {
File cachePath =
Environment.getExternalStoragePublicDirectory(Environment
.DIRECTORY_DOWNLOADS);
try {
File file = new File(String.valueOf(cachePath) + mNameFile);
mFos = new FileOutputStream(file);
DropboxAPI.DropboxFileInfo info = mApi.getFile(mPath +
mNameFile, null, mFos, null);
4.3.4 Android encryption
Android encryption is provided by Android Cryptography APIs. It consists
of three main packages [94]:
javax.crypto: This package provides the classes and interfaces for crypto-
graphic applications implementing algorithms for encryption, decryp-
tion, or key agreement.
javax.crypto.interfaces: This package provides the interfaces needed to
implement the key agreement algorithm.
javax.crypto.spec: This package provides the classes and interfaces needed
to specify keys and parameter for encryption.
Before encrypting the file, we must set up secret key spec for 128-bit AES
encryption and decryption (Source code 4.6).
Source code 4.6: Setting up secret key for encryption and decryption
public static SecretKey generateKey() throws
NoSuchAlgorithmException
{
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KeyGenerator keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");
keyGenerator.init(128);
SecretKey key = keyGenerator.generateKey();
return key;
}
Next, we create Cipher to encode the original data with AES (Source
code 4.7).
Source code 4.7: Encrypting the original data
FileOutputStream encfos = new FileOutputStream(outfile);
Cipher encipher;
encipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
encipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, mKey);
CipherOutputStream cos = new CipherOutputStream(encfos, encipher);
To decrypt a file, we get the key saved in the .key file and create Cipher
using ”AES” provider (Source code 4.8).
Source code 4.8: Decrypting the encrypted file
SecretKey mKey = KeyStoreUtils.loadKey(tmpFile);
Cipher decipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
decipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, mKey);
CipherInputStream cis = new CipherInputStream(fis, decipher);
4.3.5 Fingerprint API
Android API 23 [95] offers to authenticate users by using their fingerprint
scans, which are carefully contained within secure hardware on supported
devices. This guards against malicious actors, ensuring that users use their
fingerprint safely, even in untrusted applications. Android also provides pro-
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tection for application developers, providing assurances that a user’s finger-
print has been positively identified before providing access to secure data
or resources. This API provides cryptographic-level security for both offline
data and online interactions. When a user activates their fingerprint reader,
they’re unlocking a hardware-backed cryptographic vault. The developer can
choose what type of key is stored in that vault. In our application, symmetric
keys are used.
The fingerprint API is used in conjunction with the Android Keystore
system [96]. This system lets us store cryptographic keys in a container to
make it more difficult to extract from the device. Once keys are in the key
store, they can be used for cryptographic operations with the key material
remaining non-exportable.
Using fingerprint in our application
First a symmetric key is created in the Android Keystore using KeyGenera-
tor [97] which can only be used after the user has been authenticated with
fingerprint and pass a KeyGenParameterSpec [98]. By setting KeyGenPa-
rameterSpec.Builder.setUserAuthenticationRequired to true, we require the
user to authenticate with a fingerprint (Source code 4.9).
Source code 4.9: Create a symmetric key in the Android Keystore and require
the user to authenticate with a fingerprint
KeyGenerator mKeyGenerator;
public void createKey() {
try {
mKeyStore.load(null);
mKeyGenerator.init(new KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(KEY_NAME,
KeyProperties.PURPOSE_ENCRYPT |
KeyProperties.PURPOSE_DECRYPT)
.setBlockModes(KeyProperties.BLOCK_MODE_CBC)
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.setUserAuthenticationRequired(true)
.setEncryptionPaddings(KeyProperties
.ENCRYPTION_PADDING_PKCS7)
.build());
mKeyGenerator.generateKey();
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException |
InvalidAlgorithmParameterException | CertificateException |
IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
}
Authenticating the users via a fingerprint scan is done with an instance
of the new FingerprintManager class [99]. FingerprintManager is a class
that coordinates access to the fingerprint hardware. The start of listen-
ing to a fingerprint on the fingerprint sensor is done by calling Finger-
printManager.authenticate() with a Cipher initialized with the symmetric
key. Once the fingerprint (or password) is verified, the FingerprintMan-
ager.AuthenticationCallback #onAuthenticationSucceeded() callback is called
(Source code 4.10).
Source code 4.10: Authenticating the users with a fingerprint scan
private boolean initCipher() {
try {
mKeyStore.load(null);
SecretKey key = (SecretKey) mKeyStore.getKey(KEY_NAME, null);
mCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key);
return true;
} catch (KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException e) {
return false;
} catch (KeyStoreException | CertificateException |
UnrecoverableKeyException | IOException |
NoSuchAlgorithmException | InvalidKeyException e) {
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throw new RuntimeException("Failed to init Cipher", e);
}
}
mRetrieve.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener() {
@Override
public void onClick(View v) {
if (initCipher()) {
mFragment.setCryptoObject(new
FingerprintManager.CryptoObject(mCipher));
boolean useFingerprintPreference =
mSharedPreferences.getBoolean(getString(R.string
.use_fingerprint_to_authenticate_key), true);
if (useFingerprintPreference) {
mFragment.setStage(FingerprintAuthenticationDialogFragment
.Stage.FINGERPRINT);
} else {
mFragment.setStage(FingerprintAuthenticationDialogFragment
.Stage.PASSWORD);
}
mFragment.show(getFragmentManager(), DIALOG_FRAGMENT_TAG);
} else {
mFragment.setCryptoObject(new
FingerprintManager.CryptoObject(mCipher));
mFragment.setStage(FingerprintAuthenticationDialogFragment
.Stage.NEW_FINGERPRINT_ENROLLED);
mFragment.show(getFragmentManager(), DIALOG_FRAGMENT_TAG);
}
}
});
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public void startListening(FingerprintManager.CryptoObject
cryptoObject) {
if (!isFingerprintAuthAvailable()) {
return;
}
mCancellationSignal = new CancellationSignal();
mSelfCancelled = false;
mFingerprintManager.authenticate(cryptoObject,
mCancellationSignal, 0 /* flags */, this, null);
mIcon.setImageResource(R.drawable.ic_fp_40px);
}
To use fingerprint authentication in our application, we must add the
USE FINGERPRINT permission in the android manifest (Source code 4.11).
Source code 4.11: Fingerprint permission in the android manifest
<uses-permission
android:name="android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT"/>
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and future work
Cloud computing is based on technologies such as virtualization, distributed
computing, utility computing, network and software services. Cloud comput-
ing is one of today’s hottest research areas, because of its economic benefits.
Unfortunately, there are still some challenges to be solved. The flexibility
provided by cloud computing can be both a friend and a foe from a security
point of view. With the development and application of cloud computing,
cloud security becomes more and more important.
In this masters thesis, we first discuss security issues for a cloud according
to Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), using its Security Guidance [13] and se-
curity issues related with the cloud computing service delivery models (SPI
model) [26]. These issues include security issues related to all aspects of
infrastructure, including network level, host level and application level, the
same as CSA’s fourteen domains of cloud computing security. With the Se-
curity Guidance, we indicate that the management of security risk not only
involves the technology itself, but also involves the cloud service providers,
the users and the legal aspects of the data and services being used. The
main goal in cloud security is to securely store and manage sensitive data
that is not controlled by the owner of the data. The problem of keeping data
secure and confidential is shown through the Data Security Lifecycle, where
the process is divided into six stages: create, store, use, share, archive and
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destroy.
One approach to protect cloud data is cloud cryptography. The first level
of security where cryptography can help is secure storage, but the handicap
is that we cannot outsource the processing of this data without decrypting
it before. This thesis covers a few cryptographic schemes for cloud storage,
and presents new cryptographic techniques that provide data security and
mechanisms for searching or processing encrypted data, such as searchable
encryption and attribute-based encryption. Searchable encryption [100] is a
broad concept that allows the user not only to retrieve information privately
but also to search it. Another approach for searchable encryption is to use
asymmetric encryption. The first scheme that makes use of public key cryp-
tography is the Public-Key Encryption with keyword Search (PEKS) scheme,
proposed by Boneh [75]. By using public key cryptography it is possible for
multiple persons to encrypt data but only the owner of the private key will be
able to search for a keyword. More advanced solutions also allow searching
with wildcards [78].
In our work, we propose a new application for securing sensitive data on
Android mobile devices, with adding biometrics features to the algorithm. In
our opinion, user authentication with fingerprint scanning can improve the
security for sensitive data in the case of storing data into Dropbox cloud.
Android devices can support up to three different fingerprint scans, which
allow multiple users for this data. The problem with this feature is the
impossibility of sharing the encrypted data with another remote user. We
hope that with the future updates of Android system, this problem would
be solved. In our application, data encryption is made by AES method,
which can be the most safe, trusted technique to provide security to data in
clouds compared to other available security techniques in cloud computing.
Although encryption protects our data from unauthorized access, it does
nothing to prevent data loss, which means to lose the keys that provide
access to data.
It seems like there are enough opportunities to secure our information in
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a cloud, but for further research there still remain many open problems. For
data security and privacy issues, the fundamental challenges are separation
of sensitive data and access control. Authorization and access control mech-
anisms should achieve a unified, reusable and scalable access control model.
Another domain of future interest can be solving problems of cloud metadata
and encryption key management.
Recent advances in cryptography could mean that future cloud computing
services will be able to search, retrieve and store information in the cloud,
without first decrypting it. Over the last few years, a few encryption solutions
have been proposed for this purpose and as we have shown in the thesis, most
cryptographic primitives are ready to be used. Thus, in the near future it
is expected from cloud providers to implement them or produce efficient
implementations that could ease its inclusion in open source platforms.
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